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ABSTRACT 
 
 Hedge funds, private equity firms, and other alternative investment funds are 
frequently key players in corporate restructurings.  Most commentators agree that 
the presence of a fund can change the dynamics of a chapter 11 case.  They cannot 
agree, however, on the impact of this change—i.e., do funds create or destroy 
enterprise value?  This essay contributes to the dialogue by analyzing data from 
chapter 11 cases in which funds are in a position to influence the debtor's exit 
strategy.  The data shed light on what such funds might achieve in chapter 11 cases 
and the potential implications for debtors and their other stakeholders.  Although 
additional research is needed, the preliminary data suggest that the value of fund 
participation in chapter 11 cases likely depends on whom you ask and where they 
sit in the particular debtor's capital structure.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Tribune Company, which owns the Los Angeles Times, has been in 
bankruptcy for…well, years.  And according to recent reports, it 
won't be coming out of Chapter 11 any time soon.  So what's the 
hold up? 
 Basically, it's two very large lenders versus an incredibly 
tenacious hedge fund.
1
 
 
 The debate concerning the role of hedge funds and other alternative investment 
funds in the distressed company space is not new.
2
 It also has not changed much 
over the past decade: some commentators view distressed investors as raiders or 
vultures, while others perceive value in their intervention and activism.
3
 Like many 
robust debates, the truth likely lies somewhere in the middle, and more importantly, 
likely is case- and investor-specific.   
 Consider the chapter 11 case of the Tribune Company (Tribune).
4
 It was long.
5
 
It was acrimonious.
6
 But the company survived, and junior creditors received 
                                                                                                                                              
1
 Matthew DeBord, Aurelius Capital Management: The Hedge Fund That's Keeping Tribune in 
Bankruptcy, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RADIO, Jan. 4, 2012, 
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/economy/2012/01/04/4167/aurelius-capital-hedge-fund-s-keeping-tribune-bank/. 
2
 Commentary on distressed investors and their activism has grown as funds and creditors in general have 
exerted an increasing level of control in chapter 11 cases. See, e.g., HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE 
INVESTORS 25 (2000); Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for 
Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 404 (1996); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 674 (2003); David A. Skeel, Creditors' Ball: The "New" New 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1729 (2008); Michelle M. Harner, 
The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 706 (2008) [hereinafter Harner, Policy Implications]; Michelle M. Harner, Trends in 
Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors' Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 75 
(2008) (hereinafter Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt); Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor 
Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 513 (2009); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, 
Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 282 (2009). In 
addition, Edward I. Altman, the Max L. Heine Professor of Finance at the Stem School of Business, New 
York University, and Stuart C. Gilson, Professor of Finance at the Harvard Business School, have conducted 
extensive research on the distressed debt market. See, e.g., EDWARD I. ALTMAN, ARE HISTORICALLY BASED 
DEFAULT AND RECOVERY MODELS IN THE HIGH-YIELD AND DISTRESSED DEBT MARKETS STILL 
RELEVANT IN TODAY'S CREDIT ENVIRONMENT?, NYU Stern Sch. of Bus., Salomon Ctr. (2006), available at 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/ealtman/Are-Historical-Models-Still-Relevant1.pdf; STUART C. GILSON, 
CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 188–90 (2001); see also Harner, Policy 
Implications, supra note 2, at 708–09 (referencing additional works of Professors Altman and Gilson). 
3
 See Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt, supra note 2, at 71–72 (explaining different perspectives and 
providing relevant citations). 
4
 See In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). 
5
 Tribune filed its chapter 11 case on December 8, 2008, and it emerged from bankruptcy four years later 
on December 31, 2012. See, e.g., Liana B. Baker & Ashutosh Pandey, Publisher Tribune Emerges from 
Four-Year Bankruptcy, REUTERS, Dec. 31, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/31/us-tribune-
bankruptcy-idUSBRE8BU02120121231. 
2014] ACTIVIST INVESTORS 169 
 
 
 
 
something.
7
 Is that success?  Did the distressed investors in that case—some who 
held the senior debt and others who held the junior debt—help or hurt the 
company's restructuring efforts?
8
 The answers to these questions may depend on 
whom you ask. 
 This essay contributes anecdotal and original empirical data to the debate in an 
effort to better inform the dialogue and any resulting policy decisions.  Part I 
describes the Tribune chapter 11 case in more detail and explores the various 
parties' objectives and strategies.  Part II then reviews the competing perspectives 
on the role of distressed investors in chapter 11 cases, including related data from 
several empirical studies on hedge fund activism.  Part III presents the results of our 
empirical study that focuses on distressed investors who hold or acquire positions of 
influence in a distressed company's capital structure.  These positions may be 
unsecured and in the company's fulcrum security, which often allows holders to 
emerge as owners of the reorganized company.  Alternatively, the positions may be 
secured—either pre- or post-petition—and used in a loan-to-own strategy.  
Regardless of the starting position, the data show, among other things, that the 
presence of such distressed investors is significantly associated with survival of the 
distressed company.  Whether you view this finding as value enhancement or 
extraction likely turns on where you sit in the company's capital structure: senior 
creditors and equity may feel they lost value; management ousted through the 
power struggle may feel the same; and junior creditors (or those pari passu with the 
activist investors), as well as those who continue in the company's employ, may 
                                                                                                                                              
6
 For one description of the intense disagreements among Tribune's creditors, see Part Four: Bankruptcy 
Inc., BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 16, 2013, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-16/business/bal-tribune-
bankruptcy-bankruptcy-inc-20130116_1_aurelius-capital-management-bankruptcy-judge-kevin-carey-
tribune-co-s-chapter (describing disputes and observing that "[s]omewhere in the third year of Tribune Co.'s 
Chapter 11 proceeding, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Carey looked out at a Delaware courtroom packed 
with high-priced attorneys and conceded the case had broken down into what he called a 'multiconstituent 
melee.'"). 
7
 See, e.g., Robert Channick, Tribune Co. Emerges from Bankruptcy, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 31, 2012, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-31/news/chi-a-new-era-dawning-for-tribune-co-
20121230_1_ceo-eddy-hartenstein-brands-in-major-markets-mix-of-profitable-assets (describing structure of 
reorganized company, recoveries to junior creditors, and noting that "[d]espite the prodigious cost and length 
of the bankruptcy, [Professor Douglas] Baird said it should be judged on the outcome—the successful 
reorganization of Tribune Co. Baird made reference to Eastern Airlines, which filed for bankruptcy in 1989, 
and was grounded permanently two years later while still operating under Chapter 11."); Rich Kirchen, How 
Formerly Bankrupt Tribune Co. Will Buy Fox 6 and More, MILWAUKEE BUS. J., July 1, 2013, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/blog/2013/07/how-formerly-bankrupt-tribune-will-buy.html 
("Having shed its debt at the end of 2012, Tribune reported a net income of $422.5 million for the year. 
Revenue totaled more than $4.1 billion."). 
8
 In the Tribune chapter 11 case, Oaktree Capital Management and Angelo, Gordon & Co. held a senior 
debt position and were at odds with junior creditors, led by Aurelius Capital Management. See, e.g., Michael 
Oneal, Aurelius, Others Appeal Judge's Confirmation of Tribune Bankruptcy Plan, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 
24, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-24/business/chi-aurelius-appeals-judges-confirmation-
of-tribune-bankruptcy-plan-20120724_1_aurelius-capital-management-junior-creditors-senior-creditors. 
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have a completely different assessment of the outcome.  The beauty in distressed 
investor activism truly may be in the eyes of the beholder. 
 
I.  A CASE STUDY: TRIBUNE COMPANY 
 
 The Tribune chapter 11 case offers insights on the role of funds not only as 
secured and unsecured creditors, but also as pre-petition and post-petition creditors.  
It demonstrates the liquidity often provided by funds, and the litigation, cost, and 
delay that can occur when multiple funds are active in a case in different tranches of 
the company's debt or equity.  It also is viewed by some as a successful chapter 11 
case, while for others it represents weaknesses in the chapter 11 process.  The 
following summary highlights aspects of the Tribune case relevant to the funds' 
positions and activities. 
 
A. The Company and the Chapter 11 Filing 
 
 Tribune is one of the leading multimedia companies in the United States, 
operating in the publishing, digital media, and broadcasting spheres and reaching 
more than eighty percent (80%) of U.S. households through its multimedia 
offerings.
9
 The company's broadcasting group owns or operates 23 television 
stations and publishes several prominent newspapers, including the Los Angeles 
Times, Chicago Tribune, and the Baltimore Sun, among others.
10
 Founded in 1847, 
Tribune went public in 1983 and grew dramatically during the 1980s and 90s 
through a series of acquisitions.
11
  
 On December 8, 2008, approximately one year after the company went private 
in a complex, two-stage leveraged buyout transaction that saddled the company 
with unmanageable debt, Tribune filed for chapter 11 protection.
12
 Tribune 
eventually emerged from bankruptcy in December 2012 after four years of 
acrimonious proceedings.  Much of the acrimony was a result of divergent interests 
of various distressed investors, with one commentator noting that Tribune's 
extended stay in bankruptcy "all boils down to the Great Big Hedge Fund versus the 
Somewhat Smaller Hedge Fund."
13
  
 The Great Big Hedge Fund in this case is Oaktree Capital Management.
14
 The 
Somewhat Smaller Hedge Fund is Aurelius Capital Management, which, according 
                                                                                                                                              
9
 General Disclosure Statement at 7, In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (No. 08-
13141).  
10
 See Tribune Company History, TRIBUNE.COM, available at 
http://corporate.tribune.com/pressroom/?page_id=2313 (last visited January 18, 2014). 
11
 See id. 
12
 See General Disclosure Statement, supra note 9, at 7. 
13
 DeBord, supra note 1. 
14
 See id. 
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to some, exhibits a "stubborn willingness to wage battle" with bankrupt 
companies.
15
 
 
B. The Pre-petition Leveraged Buyout 
 
 During the fall of 2006, Tribune's board of directors formed a special 
committee to consider potential strategic transactions, and which quickly began 
exploring such transactions.
16
 Over the course of the following months, the special 
committee considered a variety of options, including a leveraged recapitalization, a 
spin-off or split-off of particular segments or a sale of all or part of the company.
17
 
Parties interested in a potential acquisition of Tribune submitted bids in January 
2007; however, none of the initial bids were satisfactory due to large shareholder 
preferences.
18
  
 Ultimately, Tribune decided to pursue the leveraged buyout transaction that 
would take the company private and convert it to an ESOP owned S-corp.
19
 The 
transaction involved two stages, each including multiple transactions.  In relevant 
part, the first stage of the leveraged buyout (LBO) involved Tribune incurring $7.3 
billion in new debt and utilizing a $250 million investment by Sam Zell's private 
investment firm EGI to fund a cash tender offer for approximately 126 million 
shares at $34 per share.
20
 In the second stage, Tribune incurred an additional $3.7 
billion of debt and purchased the remaining public shares, including EGI's shares at 
$34 per share.
21
 EGI purchased $225 million of subordinated notes and a warrant to 
purchase 40% of stock for $90 million.
22
 
                                                                                                                                              
15
 Michael Oneal, New Storm Clouds Over Tribune Co. Bankruptcy Case, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 
2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-09-25/business/ct-biz-0926-tribune-20100925_1_bankruptcy-
case-centerbridge-partners-tribune-co; see Matt Wirz & Irene Chapple, Aurelius Crosses the Ocean for Its 
Debt Bet, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703727804576011821714853378 (discussing 
Aurelius's reputation).  
16
 See Report of Kenneth N. Klee, As Examiner, Vol. 1 at 46, 101, In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (No. 08-13141). 
17
 See id. at 104. 
18
 See id. at 371. The Chandler Trusts and the McCormick Foundation together owned 33.25% of 
Tribune's common stock, and as a result, these Large Shareholders were invited to engage in discussions 
regarding the company's strategic direction. The Klee Report cites an email suggesting "it would be 'difficult 
to do a transaction unless the 30% shareholders are reasonably comfortable.'" Id. at 369. See also Holman 
W. Jenkins, Jr., Where the Tribune LBO Went Wrong, WALL ST. J., January 23, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324624404578257582356730460.html (describing 
demanded price as too high, deterring prospective buyers).  
19
 See Michael Oneal & Steve Mills, Part One: Zell's Big Gamble, THE BALTIMORE SUN, January 12, 
2013, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-12/business/bal-tribune-co-bankruptcy-sam-zells-big-
gamble-20130112_1_randy-michaels-big-gamble-buyout. 
20
 See Report of Kenneth N. Klee, supra note 16, at 124. 
21
 See id. at 194, 205–06. 
22
 See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 141 n.17 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
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 The fact that the stages were consummated months apart was relevant during 
the bankruptcy case.  During the period between the closing of stages one and two, 
the financial condition of Tribune deteriorated further; however, the second stage 
still closed despite significant concerns from the lenders' experts.
23
  
 
C. The Funds Participation in the Chapter 11 Case 
 
 On December 8, 2008, just less than one year after the second stage of the LBO 
was completed, Tribune, facing significant debt service and related payments, filed 
a voluntary chapter 11 petition.
24
 The largest senior lenders associated with the 
LBO loans—JPMorgan Chase Bank, Angelo, Gordon & Co. and Oaktree, the latter 
two as distressed debt investors—were poised to exchange their debt for equity in 
the reorganized company.
25
 The reorganization, however, was dominated with 
litigation concerning the pre-petition LBO and what the various tranches of debt 
should receive under the plan.
26
  
 In April 2010, Tribune filed the first plan of reorganization, which among other 
things, provided for some recovery for pre-LBO bondholders and settled claims 
against the LBO lenders and Tribune, effectively letting them off-the-hook.
27
 
Shortly thereafter, the bankruptcy court appointed an examiner to investigate 
possible causes of action in connection with the LBO, including claims for 
fraudulent conveyance, breach of fiduciary duty, equitable subordination, and 
others.
28
 The examiner's report, released in July 2010, indicated there was evidence 
of dishonesty by Tribune management and determined that the company's directors 
did not adequately discharge their oversight duties.
29
 The bondholders were 
especially interested in the examiner's findings, hoping to find evidence that would 
support a claim of equitable subordination or fraudulent conveyance impacting the 
LBO lenders’ senior claims.30 
 By September 2010, Aurelius had acquired a position as the most powerful 
bondholder in the case after purchasing the stake of Centerbridge Partners, another 
distressed-investment hedge fund.
31
 Although Centerbridge had been a "chief 
                                                                                                                                              
23
 See Report of Kenneth N. Klee, supra note 16, at 304. 
24
 See In re Tribune, 464 B.R. at 135. 
25
 See id. at 184. 
26
 For a summary of some of the litigation relating to the chapter 11 case, see Steven Church, Tribune 
Lawsuit Deadline Passes as Creditor Reorganization Vote Approaches, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 9, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-08/tribune-creditors-face-midnight-deadline-to-sue-over-zell-led-
2007-buyout.html. 
27
 See Randall Chase, Trustee Files Revised Lawsuits Over Tribune Buyout, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 12, 
2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/trustee-files-revised-lawsuits-over-tribune-buyout (describing Tribune's 
first reorganization plan). 
28
 See Report of Kenneth N. Klee, supra note 16, at 2. 
29
 Id. at 10–11. 
30
 See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 161 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
31
 See Oneal, supra note 15. 
2014] ACTIVIST INVESTORS 173 
 
 
 
 
agitator" pressing for legal action against the senior LBO lenders, it had also been 
willing to compromise until settlement talks collapsed.
32
 Aurelius was actively 
involved in the chapter 11 case, filing, among other things, a motion for the 
appointment of a chapter 11 trustee "to preserve and pursue the LBO-related causes 
of action," a motion to disqualify the primary counsel for the official creditors' 
committee because of conflicts, and a plan of reorganization.
33
 
 In fact, four competing creditor groups filed rival plans of reorganization: one 
supported by Aurelius and other pre-buyout bondholders, one supported by some 
senior lenders, one sponsored by hedge fund King Street Capital LP (bridge-lender 
plan),
34
 and one co-sponsored by Tribune and certain leading senior lenders.
35
 The 
warring groups argued over the wording of disclosure statements.
36
 The bankruptcy 
court ordered the competing plan proponents to attempt to mediate their 
differences.
37
 The resulting litigation relating to the turn over of documents in 
preparation for mediation hints at the tension underlying these discussions.
38
 The 
bridge lenders ultimately reached a settlement through mediation with Tribune and 
the leading senior lenders.
39
 No such agreement was reached with Aurelius. 
 The Tribune and Aurelius plans both contemplated a debt for equity swap, but 
major differences existed.  The Aurelius plan preserved the potential for 
bondholders to receive 100% of their claim depending on the results of the LBO 
litigation.
40
 The plan thus also involved pursuing claims against the LBO lenders for 
                                                                                                                                              
32
 Id. 
33
 See Motion of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, for the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee, In re 
Tribune Co. (Bankr. D. Del) (No. 08-13141) (dk. no. 5680); Motion to Disqualify Chadbourne & Parke, LLP 
from Acting on Behalf of the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors in Matters in Which it Has Conflicts of 
Interest Filed by Aurelius Capital Management, In re Tribune Co. (Bankr. D. Del.) (No. 08-13141) (dk. 
5669); see generally Joint Plan of Reorganization for Tribune Company and its Subsidiaries Proposed by 
Aurelius Capital Management, LP, In re Tribune Co. (Bankr. D. Del.) (No. 08-13141) (dk. no. 6184). 
34
 See Bill Rochelle, Tribune, Wolverine, Lehman, Downey: Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 1, 
2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-01/downey-tridimension-point-blank-loehmann-s-threat-
to-sue-bankruptcy.html. 
35
 See Steven Church, Tribune Creditor Groups Submit Rival Reorganization Plans for Publisher, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 30, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-30/tribune-creditor-aurelius-
capital-management-submits-rival-reorganization.html. 
36
 See Steven Church, Tribune Judge May Rewrite Bankruptcy Documents if Creditors Keep Feuding, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-29/tribune-judge-may-
rewrite-reorganization-documents-update1-.html. 
37
 See Order Appointing Mediator, In re Tribune, Co. (Bankr. D. Del.) (No. 08-13141) (dk. no. 5591); see 
also Church, supra note 36. 
38
 See Steven Church, Tribune Creditors May Be Seeking Too Many Documents, Bankruptcy Judge Says, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-24/tribune-judge-challenges-
creditors-document-request-update1-.html; Bill Rochelle, Vitro, Satmex, Nortel, Workflow, Lehman: 
Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-25/vitro-nortel-
workflow-lehman-fairpoint-javo-bankruptcy.html. 
39
 See Bill Rochelle, Grace, Tribune, GM, Innkeepers, AmTrust: Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 1, 
2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/wr-grace-gm-innkeepers-townsends-orchard-brands-
bankruptcy.html. 
40
 Steven Church, Tribune Creditors Open Bankruptcy Court Dispute Over Buyout, BLOOMBERG NEWS, 
Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-07/tribune-creditors-open-bankruptcy-court-
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moving forward with the buyout in light of Tribune’s financial condition. 41 
Unsecured creditors criticized the Aurelius plan because it would leave ownership 
of the company "in limbo."
42
 Tribune's competing plan would distribute the 
company's stock more quickly, allow for the LBO Lenders to receive distributions, 
preserve causes of action, and result in Aurelius and other pre-buyout creditors 
receiving some distributions.
43
 The bankruptcy judge rejected both plans in October 
2011 and "compared [the] two groups of competing creditors to warring animals in 
a parable about a fox and scorpion who must cooperate to cross a river safely."
44
 
 Prior to the bankruptcy judge’s ruling in October 2011, Tribune moved forward 
with confirmation of its plan, and Aurelius fought Tribune at every turn.  For 
example, Aurelius asked the bankruptcy judge to postpone the confirmation 
process, arguing that amendments to the Tribune plan required Tribune to resolicit 
creditor votes.
45
 Aurelius also asked the judge to reject Tribune's plan because it 
was proposed in bad faith.  Aurelius hired Mark Prak to testify on behalf of 
Aurelius that the JPMorgan, Angelo Gordon, and Oaktree stake in newspaper and 
broadcasting would violate FCC media ownership rules.
46
 Aurelius also 
subsequently appealed the judge's approval of Tribune's plan and sought a stay of 
the company's bankruptcy in order for a higher court to review the confirmation 
order.
47
 
 The bankruptcy judge denied the requested stay without bond, and Tribune's 
plan closed despite the appeal.
48
 Nevertheless, Aurelius did win a few of its chosen 
battles.  For example, Aurelius successfully argued that lawsuits against former 
                                                                                                                                              
dispute-over-buyout.html (discussing noteholder plan calling for a significant portion of Tribune stock being 
put into trust and not distributed until the main buyout lawsuit ends, based on who wins. "The lender lawsuit 
may bring more than $1.57 billion to non-LBO creditors, Aurelius said in court papers while predicting a 57 
percent chance of victory. If Aurelius wins, the lenders wouldn't recover anything until the pre-buyout 
creditors are repaid all $2.5 billion they claim they are owed."). 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Steven Church & Karen Gullo, Tribune Judge Rejects JPMorgan, Aurelius Reorganization Plans, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-31/tribune-judge-rejects-
competing-jpmorgan-aurelius-reorganization-plans.html. 
45
 See Dow Jones Newswires-Wall Street Journal, Aurelius: Halt Tribune Confirmation Hearings, 
CHICAGO BREAKING BUSINESS, Apr. 11, 2011, 
http://archive.chicagobreakingbusiness.com/2011/04/aurelius-calls-for-halt-to-tribune-confirmation-
hearings.html. 
46
 See Steven Church, JPMorgan Stake in Tribune Will Violate FCC Rule, Lawyer Claims at Hearing, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-17/jpmorgan-stake-in-
tribune-will-violate-fcc-rule-lawyer-claims-at-hearing.html. 
47
 See Steven Church, Tribune Creditors Appeal, Seek to Halt Bankruptcy Plan, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jul. 
24, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-24/tribune-creditors-appeal-seek-to-halt-bankruptcy-
plan.html. 
48
 See In re Tribune, Co., 476 B.R. 843, 866 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); see also Todd Shields & Steven 
Church, Tribune May Get Last Approval Needed to Exit Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 16, 
2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-16/tribune-may-get-last-approval-needed-to-exit-
bankruptcy. 
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shareholders should be allowed to proceed in state court.
49
 In addition, it won access 
to pre-bankruptcy payment data.
50
 
 
D. Winners and Losers? 
 
 Tribune emerged from bankruptcy in December of 2012, intending to sell many 
of its assets.
51
 The fraudulent conveyance litigation against former shareholders of 
Tribune who received payouts as part of the LBO was consolidated and transferred 
to the Southern District of New York,
52
 and remained active for quite some time.  
When the court finally dismissed the individual creditors' suit, the opinion indicated 
that such individual creditors may not pursue claims that are simultaneously being 
pursued by the litigation trustee appointed under Tribune's bankruptcy plan.
53
 
Although this may have been a victory of some sort for the defendants, this one 
fraudulent conveyance case lasted over two years.
54
 
 Only two months out of bankruptcy, reorganized Tribune hired consultants to 
look into the sale of the newspaper business, which has not occurred despite some 
interest from bidders.
55
 Six months after emerging, Tribune announced that it might 
divide its primary business divisions, broadcast and publishing, into two companies 
to help avoid a large tax bill and to "allow each company to maximize its flexibility 
and competitiveness in a rapidly changing media environment."
56
 Tribune is still in 
business, but looking for ways to cut expenses and improve profits.
57
 
 As for Tribune's creditors, the litigation trustee's lawsuits against the former 
Tribune shareholders, which Aurelius fought to preserve for the benefit of 
"innocent" non-LBO creditors, continues.  The value of that litigation remains to be 
seen and will need to be assessed in light of the time and expense associated with 
the plan litigation during the chapter 11 case.  In addition, note holders will 
                                                                                                                                              
49
 Steven Church, Tribune Creditors Can Sue Former Shareholders, Bankruptcy Judge Rules, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-22/tribune-creditors-can-sue-
former-shareholders-judge-says-in-delaware.html. 
50
 Steven Church, Tribune Noteholders Win Access to Shareholder Pre-Bankruptcy Payment System, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 17, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-17/tribune-noteholders-win-
access-to-shareholder-payment-amounts.html. 
51
 See Baker & Pandey, supra note 5. 
52
 In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 831 F. Supp.2d 1371, 1372 (J.P.M.L. 2011).  
53
 See In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 499 B.R. 310, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Tom 
Hals, Former Tribune Co. Shareholders Notch Legal Victory, REUTERS, Sept. 23, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/23/tribune-clawback-ruling-idUSL2N0HJ29320130923. 
54
 See Civil Docket at 1, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 291 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(11-MD-02296, 12-MC-2296) (stating case was filed on December 20, 2011). The cases were consolidated 
in December 2011. 
55
 Christine Haughney & David Carr, To Cut Taxes, Tribune is to Split into Broadcasting and Publishing 
Units, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/media/tribune-co-to-split-
in-two.html?_r=0. 
56
 Id. 
57
 See Roger Yu, Tribune Eyes Expense Cuts in Newspaper Unit, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/27/tribune-cuts/2882531/. 
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arguably fair better as a result of the plan litigation, ultimately receiving 
distributions from the litigation trust.
58
 Bondholders might have achieved that value 
allocation earlier in the case,
59
 without the full array of tactics employed by 
Aurelius, but such speculation becomes yet another factor creating value 
uncertainty in these types of fund cases. 
  
E. Consider a Comparison 
 
 The Lyondell Chemical Co. bankruptcy was in some ways quite similar to that 
of Tribune: Lyondell filed only one month after Tribune; both companies had 
completed a leveraged buyout that contributed to their financial distress;
60
 and there 
were allegations of fraudulent conveyance in both cases.
61
 Moreover, fund 
involvement (including the involvement of Aurelius) was apparent in both:
62
 
                                                                                                                                              
58
 The EGI-TRB LLC Notes claims and the PHONES Notes claims received more in the fourth plan than 
they did in the initial plan, where they were to be cancelled with holders receiving nothing. By the fourth 
plan, these noteholders were deemed allowed claimholders for approximately $759 million for PHONES and 
$225 million for the EGI-TRB notes. See Disclosure Statement for Joint Plan of Reorganization for Tribune 
Company and Its Subsidiaries at 11, In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (No. 08-13141); 
Supplemental Disclosure Document Relating to Fourth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization for Tribune 
Company and its Subsidiaries Proposed by the Debtors, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, 
Oaktree Capital Management, L.P., Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P., and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. at 4, 15, 
In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (No. 08-13141). The improvement in the PHONES 
notes recovery was part of the Noteholder Plan and it appears to have been the result of advocacy by 
Aurelius and other funds, Citadel Equity Fund Ltd., and Camden Asset Management, L.P. See Letter from 
Mark D. Brodsky, Chairman, Aurelius Capital Management, A Personal Appeal to Tribune's Non-LBO 
Creditors, Aurelius Capital Management, LP (Nov. 23, 2010) (hereinafter Brodsky Letter), available at 
http://bankrupt.com/misc/Tribune_AureliusRSrevised.pdf. See also Chris Nolter, Tribune Nears Exit from 
Acrimonious Chapter 11 Case, THE DEAL PIPELINE, Jun. 1, 2012, 
http://www.thedeal.com/content/restructuring/tribune-nears-exit-from-acrimonious-chapter-11-
case.php#ixzz2gTegFn3g (discussing arguments by Citadel and Camden). 
59
 Aurelius's victories were modest considering its goals were a bit broader. Aurelius's other efforts to 
increase the value of the estate failed; the failed arguments included: the Bar Order was unfair and 
unreasonable; the Senior Lender settlement was too good/gave culpable parties a windfall; and the Stage 1 
and Stage 2 LBO lenders should not receive the same treatment under the plan. See In re Tribune Co., 464 
B.R. 126, 178, 180 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (Judge Carey's order denying confirmation of third plans discusses 
and invalidates a number of Aurelius's arguments); see also Brodsky Letter, supra note 58. 
60
 See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 237–39 (Del. 2009) (discussing negotiations regarding 
merger/LBO); Tiffany Kary, Blavatnik Made $1.2 Billion in Lyondell LBO, Lawsuit Says, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-30/blavatnik-made-1-2-billion-in-lyondell-
buyout-creditors-lawsuit-says.html. 
61
 See In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 467 B.R. 712, 715–17 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2012) (discussing fraudulent 
transfer claims); Al Greenwood, Lyondell Creditors Seek U.S. Suit Against Lenders, Officers, ICIS NEWS, 
June 17, 2009, http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/06/17/9225742/Lyondell-creditors-seek-US-suit-against-
lenders-officers.html; Al Greenwood, Greed Doomed Lyondell Deal—U.S. Lawsuit, ICIS NEWS, July 24, 
2009, http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/07/24/9235043/Greed-doomed-Lyondell-deal-US-lawsuit.html. 
62
 See, e.g., Response of Aurelius Capital Management in Further Support of Certain of Bank of New York 
Mellon's, In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No.09-10023); Exhibit A to 
Third Amended Plan, In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-10023) 
(discussing Aurelius's noteholder status); Wirz & Chapple, supra note 15 (mentioning Aurelius's 
involvement with Lyondell).  
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Investment funds Apollo Management,
63
 Ares Management, Access Industries (led 
by investor Len Blavatnik), and others were significant players in the Lyondell 
bankruptcy case.
64
 
 The Lyondell case had some comparable hiccups: A number of the secured 
lenders including Ares Management, Highland Capital Management, and others 
opposed the company's debtor-in-possession financing motion.
65
 A major creditor 
opposed the retention of a new chief financial officer.
66
 The creditors' committee 
requested the appointment of an examiner, primarily to investigate one fund's 
involvement in various facets of the bankruptcy case.
67
 In addition, and in order to 
emerge from chapter 11, Lyondell negotiated a $450 million settlement with 
creditors during the course of the case regarding the LBO.
68
 
 Despite these obstacles and significant involvement from funds, however, 
Lyondell emerged from bankruptcy after less than sixteen months.
69
 The Tribune 
and Lyondell reorganizations demonstrate the variance in fund investment 
strategies, investment horizons, and objectives.  These variances and the related 
empirical literature are discussed in Part II, and the Tribune outcome is in many 
ways representative of the data presented in Part III. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
63
 Media reports indicate Apollo became Lyondell's largest secured creditor after purchasing 
approximately $2 billion of term loans at a discount. Nathan Vardi, How Billionaires Lost and Made 
Fortunes in LyondellBasell, FORBES, Mar. 11, 2011, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2011/03/11/how-billionaires-lost-and-made-fortunes-in-
lyondellbasell/. 
64
 See Emily Chason & Chelsea Emery, Update 2—Lyondell Settlement Paves Way for Bankruptcy Exit, 
REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/16/lyondellbasell-
idUSN1624804820100216. 
65
 Objection of Certain Senior Secured Lenders to Debtors' Motion for an Order (I) Authorizing Debtors 
(A) to Obtain Post-Petition Financing, In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 
09-10023). 
66
 Objection of ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. to the Debtors' Motion for an Order Approving Compensation 
Terms with Respect to the Retention of C. Kent Potter as Chief Financial Officer, In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 
402 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-10023); Al Greenwood, Creditor Opposes Lyondell Choice 
for Chief Financial Officer, ICIS NEWS, Sept. 2, 2009, 
http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/09/02/9244641/creditor-opposes-lyondell-choice-for-chief-financial-
officer.html. 
67
 Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Appointment of an Examiner, In re 
Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-10023) (examiner request was for 
"limited purposes of investigating: (i) the Debtors' selection of a conflicted Rights Offering Sponsor, (ii) the 
Debtors' refusal to refinance the DIP Facility, and (iii) the Debtors' refusal to formulate a robust plan of 
reorganization with an appropriate reserve for unsecured creditors pending resolution of the Committee's 
litigation."). 
68
 See Pratish Narayanan & Chelsea Emery, Lyondell Restructuring Plan Includes Apollo Role, REUTERS, 
Mar. 8, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/09/us-lyondell-idUSTRE6280LG20100309. 
69
 Lindsey Bewley, LyondellBasell's Exit Strategy, IHS CHEM. WEEK, May 14, 2010), 
http://www.chemweek.com/sections/companies/LyondellBasells-Exit-Strategy_26737.html; see James 
Cordrey, Lyondell Officially Emerges from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, LEXISNEXIS LITIG. BLOG, May 3, 2010, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/b/litigation-blog/archive/2010/05/03/lyondell-
officially-emerges-from-chapter-11-bankruptcy.aspx. 
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II.  FUND STRATEGIES AND IMPACT IN CHAPTER 11 
 
 Fund participation in distressed situations is not a new investment strategy, but 
both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest a growth in fund participation in 
chapter 11 cases, largely since 2000.
70
 This trend reflects all investment strategies, 
including passive and activist strategies, as well as loan-to-loan and loan-to-own 
strategies.
71
 Although some funds invoke only one investment strategy (e.g., day 
traders), many funds utilize several different strategies depending on the company, 
its capital structure, and the fund's desired rate of return and risk tolerance.
72
 
 Most commentators and practitioners agree that funds are increasingly present 
at the negotiating table in chapter 11 cases,
73
 but they strongly disagree about the 
funds' impact on the company's restructuring efforts.
74
 The vulture versus phoenix 
debate rages on in conference rooms, courtrooms, and the media.
75
 Similar to the 
"raider" versus "white knight" characterizations in the solvent corporate takeover 
context, these labels are just that—superficial descriptions of outside investors 
colored by the emotions and the financial interests of the observer.   
                                                                                                                                              
70
 See sources cited supra note 2; see also EDITH S. HOTCHKISS ET AL., Bankruptcy and the Resolution of 
Financial Distress, HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE, vol. 2 46 (B. Espen Eckbo ed. 2008); 
Wei Jiang et al., Hedge Funds and Chapter 11, 67 J. FIN. 513, 513 (2012); Kai Li & Wei Wang, Creditor 
Governance Through Loan-to-Loan and Loan-to-Own, 13 (Working Paper, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2275635; Jongha Lim, The Role of Activist Funds in Financially Distressed Firms 
(Working Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285884; Jared A. Ellias, Do Activist Investors 
Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 11? Evidence from Junior Activist Investing (Rock Center 
for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ. (Working Paper No. 155, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2308994.  
71
 Passive strategies include trading in and out of the debt on a periodic basis to capture value disparities in 
pricing and purchasing the debt (including trade claims) at a steep discount with the expectation of a higher 
recover under the plan of reorganization or other bankruptcy distribution scheme. Activist strategies include 
buying the debt or extending credit to the company with the objective of influencing the restructuring to 
increase value and distributions on the fund's tranche of debt or swapping the debt for equity in a loan-to-
own play. For an overview of fund strategies in the distressed space, see MICHELLE M. HARNER ET AL., 
Distressed Debt Investing, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: INSTRUMENTS, PERFORMANCE, BENCHMARKS, 
AND STRATEGIES 303 (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck eds., 2013). 
72
 Bo. J. Howell, Hedge Funds: A New Dimension in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 7 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 35, 39–40 (2008). 
73
 Perhaps one reason there has been more distressed debt investing by funds is that there is much more 
defaulting debt. See Edward I. Altman, The Role of Distressed Debt Markets, Hedge Funds and Recent 
Trends in Bankruptcy on the Outcomes of Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 75, 
80–81 (2014) (figures 3 and 4 detailing total filings and liabilities of chapter 11 filing companies show 
significant spikes in default amounts during early 2000s and 2008-09). 
74
 Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians at the Gate?, 89 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 155, 164–67 (2011) (hereinafter Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders) (explaining changes 
around restructuring negotiating table and various characterization of funds at the table). 
75
 Id. at 165–66 nn.33 & 34. See also In re Ion Media Networks, 419 B.R. 585, 588–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (describing a fund's bankruptcy tactics as aggressive); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition - 
from Boom to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 390–91 (2007) (noting distressed debt 
investors are often aggressive and conduct "pernicious litigation" in bankruptcy). 
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 Critics of funds point to their scorch-earth tactics that often involve prolonged 
and expensive litigation.
76
 These concerns are highlighted in cases with multiple 
funds holding different tranches of the company's debt or equity.
77
 Management 
also is skeptical of most funds, likely not knowing of their existence in the 
company's capital structure until after restructuring efforts are underway and 
perhaps feeling blind-sided by the funds' tactics, which tend to be different than 
those of traditional relationship lenders.
78
 Funds also have a reputation for replacing 
management and wanting more of a say in governance and managerial decisions.
79
 
 Supporters of funds, and distressed debt investing in general,
80
 emphasize the 
liquidity often provided by funds as the lenders of last resort.
81
 They also believe 
fund participation disciplines management and can level the playing field between 
the senior secured lenders and management, particularly where the fund holds the 
unsecured fulcrum debt.
82
 In addition, they suggest that funds generally provide 
                                                                                                                                              
76
 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 89–91, 99 (discussing investor tactics that may delay 
restructuring process and providing case examples). 
77
 See Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders, supra note 74, at 188–89 (discussing delays in Tribune 
case as a result of diverging interests of creditor/funds); Emily Chasan, Fight Over What Six Flags is Worth 
Could Get Ugly, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/04/us-sixflags-
idUSTRE5B30AR20091204 (discussing valuation disagreements between funds, which prolonged case). See 
also Jared A. Ellias, Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 11?: Evidence 
from Junior Activist Investing 1–2 (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 451 2013) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2308994 (stating some senior creditors perceive junior activist investors as using 
"terrorist litigation practices"). 
78
 See Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders, supra note 74, at 164 nn.26 & 29; Frederick 
Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 115, 133–35 (2009) (explaining traditional relationship between a lender and borrower and 
changes in dynamics of that relationship); Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the 
Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 641, 641–50 (2009). 
79
 See Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt, supra note 2, at 86 n.76 (data reporting that, of those 
respondents who invest in distressed debt, approximately 29% attempt to influence management personnel 
changes and approximately 37% attempt to replace certain key members of management in efforts to acquire 
control of company). 
80
 Professor Edward I. Altman notes that distressed debt investors play an important role in the loan and 
bond markets, providing increased depth and liquidity. See Altman, supra note 73, at 76 (estimating there 
are currently "more than 200 financial institutions investing between $400-450 billion in the distressed debt 
market in the U.S."). 
81
 See, e.g., Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders, supra note 74 at 169–70 (noting willingness of 
distressed investors to invest in troubled company can have very positive implications for company and its 
stakeholders); Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence 
in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191, 267–68 (2005) (noting claims 
trading can add beneficial market liquidity); Vikas Agarwal & Costanza Meneghetti, The Role of Hedge 
Funds as Primary Lenders, 14 REV. DERIV. RES. 241, 242–43 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596830 (finding overall hedge fund lending adds value and financial markets view 
their involvement as positive). 
82
 See Goldschmid, supra note 81, at 255–61 (discussing how distressed debt investor involvement often 
results in better outcomes because they tend to behave like shareholders interested in long-term value of 
company than senior lenders in a chapter 11 case). 
180 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22: 167 
 
 
  
creditors with an alternative exit strategy, and that activist funds frequently unlock 
value for all creditors.
83
 
 Interestingly, anecdotal and to some extent empirical evidence supports all of 
the foregoing arguments.
84
 That perhaps is not surprising given the variety of funds 
and the unique circumstances of most chapter 11 opportunities.
85
 Rather than trying 
to account for all of these variations, the remainder of this essay focuses on funds 
pursuing takeover (frequently loan-to-own) opportunities.  The next section 
explains the parameters of the empirical study and describes certain key results 
relating to activist funds and the takeover/loan-to-own strategies.  The data offer 
valuable insights and highlight additional questions we should strive to answer to 
better inform the ongoing debate.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
83
 See Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 515 (stating "our evidence is more supportive of efficiency gains 
brought by hedge funds than of value extraction from other claims. The presence of hedge fund unsecured 
creditors is associated with both higher total debt (including secured and unsecured) recovery . . . ."); Martin 
Eisenberg, When Hedge Funds Invest in Distressed Debt, N.Y.L.J. 11 (Oct. 15, 2007) ("A balanced 
assessment of the impact of distressed investing in bankruptcy proceedings demonstrates that distressed 
investors are beneficial to the reorganization process contributing, among other things, substantial resources 
in the form of capital, financial acumen and expertise."). 
84
 See Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt, supra note 2, at 91–92 (discussing empirical study of 
institutional and distressed debt investors based primarily on survey responses providing insight on 
investment practices and investment strategies, including use of distressed debt to influence board or 
management and the use of investing to acquire ownership); Jiang et al., supra note 70 at 514 (empirical 
study finding that hedge funds strategically choose positions in capital structure of the company, help 
balance power between the debtor and secured creditors, exert power in the bankruptcy case over 
management and some management decisions, and bring about higher probabilities of emergence and 
payoffs for junior claims); Li & Wang, supra note 70 (empirical study finding distressed debt investors that 
pursue loan-to-own strategies exert influence, weaken liquidation bias of secured creditors but also improve 
corporate governance and operating performance of reorganized firm); Lim, supra note 70 (empirical study 
finding that hedge fund involvement in chapter 11 is associated with higher probability of completing 
prepackaged restructurings, faster restructurings, and greater debt reduction for the emerging firm); Ellias 
supra note 70 (finding that hedge funds in junior claimant position in chapter 11 increase the appraised value 
of the restructuring transaction). 
85
 One example of a unique chapter 11 opportunity is fund investment in an obscure pool of General 
Motors debt that allowed the funds to recover significant amounts in the case. See Tiffany Kary, Hedge 
Funds Used Obscure Bond Bet to Win in GM Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG PERSONAL FINANCE, Oct. 5, 2013, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-04/hedge-funds-used-obscure-bond-bet-to-win-in-gm-
bankruptcy.html (also noting role of Fortress Investment Group and Elliot Management Corp. in rejecting 
GM's last-ditch effort to avoid bankruptcy). 
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III.  STUDY OF ACTIVIST FUNDS IN CHAPTER 11 
 
 The primary objective of the study was to analyze cases where funds were 
"purchasers"
86
 of the debtor during the course of the bankruptcy and determine to 
what extent funds influenced the debtor's exit strategy.
87
 Although funds can be 
"activist" in other respects, this study seeks to understand the dynamics and impact 
of funds involved in a takeover strategy.  In such cases, a fund may attempt to 
purchase the debtor's assets outright, credit bid for the debtor's assets, invest new 
capital in exchange for reorganized equity,
88
 or pursue a debt-for-equity exchange 
under the plan of reorganization.
89
 Accordingly, in nearly all cases identified as a 
"fund case" in the dataset, the funds were positioned to own at least a majority of 
the company or its assets after the chapter 11 case. 
 
A. The Dataset 
 
 The starting point for our dataset is the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research 
Database (the BRD).  The BRD includes all bankruptcy cases filed from 1980 to the 
present,
90
 by or against a business debtor or group of affiliated debtors that had 
assets worth $100 million or more, measured in 1980 dollars.  The total number of 
cases included in our original dataset is 917.  We also further limited the dataset to 
cases filed between January 5, 2000 and January 28, 2013 and for which the 
relevant bankruptcy documents were available electronically.  Our final dataset 
includes 490 chapter 11 cases.  We continue to refine and supplement these data; 
the results presented here represent the dataset analysis as of August 2013. 
 We then supplemented the BRD data by collecting and manually coding 
information concerning: whether there was a "sale" of all or part of the debtor 
during the bankruptcy;
91
 the identity of purchasing parties; whether those parties 
constituted a "fund" for our purposes; whether a Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) 
was appointed in connection with the chapter 11 case; whether the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) was replaced in the three years prior to the chapter 11 case; and 
                                                                                                                                              
86
 Our initial inquiry was whether there was a "sale" of the debtor; the definition of a "sale" is broad and a 
case was categorized as a sale if one or more funds bought the debtor's assets or an interest in the debtor's 
business from the estate. However, no minimum purchase was required to classify the case as a sale. A case 
might be categorized as a both a sale and a reorganization if the purchaser obtained less than half of the 
reorganized equity in exchange for a new investment. The purchaser must give new value, except as noted 
below, in order for the case to be categorized a sale; a creditor or equity holder that receives a distribution on 
account of its claim or interest is not a purchaser; a sale did not occur. If a creditor credit-bids in an actual 
sale or auction, however, the case is categorized as a sale. 
87
 We did not capture cases where a fund acquires control solely by purchasing a majority of the pre-
petition debt and exchanging it for equity, unless the fund invests new capital in some form. 
88
 This often, but not always, arises in the context of an equity rights offering pursuant to a plan of 
reorganization. 
89
 See sources cited supra note 87.  
90
 Much of the BRD is updated monthly to include recent filings and recent updates.  
91
 See sources cited supra notes 86, 87. 
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certain other information concerning the funds' debt positions and the company's 
exit strategy.   
 Of the 490 cases, 126 are referred to as "fund cases," meaning that at least one 
of the purchasing parties was a fund.
92
 This finding corresponds with other studies 
that find that funds pursue "loan-to-own strategies" in approximately 25-30% of 
chapter 11 cases.
93
 The percentage of fund cases in any given year, however, varies 
as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of cases with fund participation over time (N=490). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
92
 First we identified whether the debtor sold all or part of the company during bankruptcy; the sale might 
be pursuant to the plan of reorganization or not. We categorized a case as a "sale" whether or not the 
purchaser acquired 51% or more of the assets of the reorganized company. Further variables were used to 
indicate the percentage acquired by the purchaser. If the purchaser received 49% or less of the company, we 
would have indicated "yes" to a "sale" but then we categorized the case as a reorganization plan. If the 
purchaser received 50% or more of the assets or stock of the reorganized company—but not through a 363 
sale—it was categorized as a sale/merger, described in this essay as a change of control plan. If one or 
multiple purchasers received all or substantially all of the assets of the debtor through a 363 sale, and at least 
one division of the company remained intact and in operation we categorized the cases as a section 363 sale. 
Lastly, if none of the other categories applied, we labeled the case as a piecemeal liquidation. See also supra 
note 86.  
93
 See, e.g., Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 528 (table indicates that an average of 27.7% of funds adopt 
loan-to-own strategy); See Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt, supra note 2, at 88, 97 (noting 21 of 82 
(25.9%) distressed investment funds loan directly to distressed companies in loan-to-own strategy, and 26 of 
82 (31.7%) invest in distressed debt in pursuit of the strategy). 
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B. Key Data and Interesting Associations 
 
 Despite the high profile nature of many takeover and loan-to-own cases, as 
noted above, our data suggest that only 25.7 percent of cases end with a fund 
owning a majority position in the reorganized company or its assets.  Admittedly, 
these data do not account for other loan-to-own scenarios, such as when the general 
unsecured creditors as a class receive reorganized equity under the plan and funds 
hold a piece of that debt.
94
 Our data are important to the dialogue, however, because 
the cases represent true control plays—i.e., the funds in these cases were seeking 
and actually obtained control of the distressed company. 
 Of the 126 fund cases, 68 (54.0 percent) involve funds as pre-petition 
stakeholders of the debtor (see Figure 2 for time trend); 24 of the 126 fund cases 
(19.0 percent) involve funds that also extended DIP financing to the company.
95
 
Approximately half of the funds with a pre-petition stake in the debtor were pre-
petition noteholders, suggesting that funds in the dataset frequently identified this 
tranche of debt as the fulcrum security.
96
 Moreover, 37 (29.4 percent) of these cases 
involved CROs; 57 (45.2 percent) experienced a change in the CEO during the three 
years prior to the chapter 11 case; and 47 (37.3 percent) experienced a change in the 
CEO during the chapter 11 case.
97
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
94
 See, e.g., supra note 87. 
95
 This percentage is likely underinclusive due to difficulties identifying participants in syndicated DIP 
loans.  
96
 The actual data break down as follows: of the 126 fund cases, in 51 (40.5 percent) of cases, the fund had 
no pre-petition relationship with the debtor; 26 (20.6 percent) of the funds were pre-petition noteholders; 15 
(11.9 percent) were pre-petition secured creditors; 8 (6.3 percent) were pre-petition equity-holders; 5 (3.97 
percent) were unsecured creditors; 7 (5.56 percent) held multiple tranches of the debtor's pre-petition capital 
structure; 2 (1.59 percent) were pre-petition insiders or other; 5 (4.0 percent) were non-specific pre-petition 
creditors (meaning the disclosure statement indicated the fund credit-bid for the debtor's assets, without 
additional information, or the fund was merely described as a creditor); and in 7 cases (5.6 percent), there 
was insufficient data in the bankruptcy filings to determine whether there was a pre-petition relationship.  
97
 The dataset includes pre-petition CEO information for 342 cases and post-petition CEO information for 
375 cases.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of fund cases with pre-petition relationship over time 
(N=126). 
 
1. Fund Cases and Emergence 
 
 We started our analysis by reviewing the outcomes of the chapter 11 cases in 
the dataset and scrutinizing the vehicle used to facilitate those outcomes.  These 
data focus on whether the company reorganized through a traditional stand-alone 
plan ("reorganization plan") or a sale or other change of control transaction under 
the plan ("change of control plan"); used a sale of substantially all of its assets 
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code ("section 363 sale"); or liquidated.  In 
addition, we considered whether the debtor company "emerged" on the other side of 
the reorganization plan, change of control plan, or section 363 sale, meaning that at 
least one of the affiliated debtor companies continued in business under the same or 
similar name following the emergence transaction.  Moreover, to assess the 
effectiveness of the emergence vehicle, we analyzed data on whether the emerged 
company refiled a bankruptcy case. 
 With respect to chapter 11 outcomes on the whole, 219 (44.7 percent) of the 
total cases ended in a plan of reorganization, 104 (21.2 percent) ended in a change 
in control plan, and 106 (21.6 percent) ended in a section 363 sale.  Our data show, 
however, that funds prefer obtaining post-emergence control through a control 
change under a plan of reorganization; approximately 54.8 percent of the fund cases 
emerged through a plan of reorganization that facilitated a change in control in 
favor of the funds.  More specifically, fund cases show lower percentages for plans 
of reorganization and higher percentages for change of control plans, 15 (11.9 
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percent) and 69 (54.8 percent), respectively, than cases without funds [204 (56.0 
percent) and 35 (9.6 percent), respectively].
98
 Overall, 311 (63.5 percent) of all 
companies in the dataset emerge in some fashion.
99
 See Figure 3 for an illustration 
of the distribution of emergence vehicle overall and by fund status. 
 
 
Figure 3. Emergence vehicle by fund status and overall. 
 
 The data below dive deeper into the emergence and related variables.  These 
data provide interesting insights and support preliminary inferences concerning the 
role of funds in chapter 11 and the value of their activities.  Notably, the data do not 
support causal relationships; it is difficult to isolate the impact of funds on case 
outcomes or the value of stakeholder distributions.
100
 
 
a.  Emergence as an indicator of success 
 
 As explained above, the study's concept of emergence focuses on the 
continuation of the debtor's business under the same or a similar name.  Such an 
emergence—whether through a reorganization plan, change of control plan, or 
section 363 sale—possesses characteristics arguably aligned with the original policy 
goals underlying the Bankruptcy Code: it permits a company to rightsize its 
                                                                                                                                              
98
 The authors recognize potential endogeneity bias and selection effect in some of the data. Accordingly, 
the correlations presented in this essay do not support casual findings but should be used to inform the 
dialogue concerning fund cases.  
99
 Focusing solely on the 311 companies in the dataset that emerged in some fashion, fund cases show 
higher percentages both for change of control plans and section 363 sales, 61 (66.3 percent) and 16 (17.4 
percent), respectively, than cases without funds [9 (4.1 percent) and 18 (8.2 percent), respectively]. 
100
 See supra note 98.  
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operations and balance sheet through the chapter 11 case and to continue as a 
productive citizen, employer, and taxpayer in the affected communities.
101
  
 Of the 490 total cases, 477 were identified as having emerged or not.
102
 The 
relationship between having a fund and emerging from chapter 11 was significant 
((X
2
(1, N = 477) = 5.974, p = .015) such that fund cases were more likely to emerge 
(74.2 percent) than non-fund cases (62.0 percent).
103
 As mentioned previously, fund 
cases were more likely than non-fund cases to emerge via change of control plans 
and section 363 sales.   
 In light of the anecdotal evidence suggesting that funds use DIP financing to 
achieve their investment objectives, we also explored whether fund participation in 
the DIP financing was related to the vehicle for emerging.
104
 Of the 33 fund cases 
emerging via a known vehicle and for which fund participation in DIP is known, 18 
(54.5 percent) involved fund participation in the DIP financing.  Due to the small 
number of cases available for analysis, there was limited statistical power to detect 
the relationship between participation in DIP financing and the vehicle for 
emerging.  The data do suggest, however, that, compared to fund cases without fund 
involvement in the DIP financing, fund cases with such fund involvement may have 
been more likely to emerge via reorganization (16.7 percent vs. 6.7 percent, 
respectively), less likely to emerge via change of control plans (55.6 percent vs. 
80.0 percent), and more likely to emerge via section 363 sales (27.8 percent vs. 6.7 
percent). 
 Lastly, given the apparent increase in funds purchasing pre-petition debt to 
acquire control, we also explored whether the fund holding a pre-petition debt 
position was related to the vehicle for emerging (see Figure 4).
105
 Of the 88 fund 
cases emerging via a known vehicle and with a known pre-petition debt position, 59 
(67.0 percent) involved such a relationship.  Compared to fund cases without a pre-
petition debt position, fund cases with such a relationship were equally likely to 
emerge via reorganization [11.9 percent vs. 20.7 percent; X
2
(1, N = 88) = 1.203, p = 
.273], significantly more likely to emerge via change of control plans [76.3 percent 
vs. 51.7 percent; X
2
(1, N = 88) = 5.400, p = .020], and as likely to emerge via 
section 363 sales [11.1 percent vs. 24.1 percent; X
2
(1, N = 88) = 2.189, p = .139]. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
101
 Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 146–48 (2005) 
(discussing rehabilitative policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code). 
102
 The remaining 13 cases were either pending (10), not classified (2), or had no data (1). 
103
 See supra note 98 (discussing potential endogeneity bias and selection effect). 
104
 See, e.g., Lim, supra note 70, at 21–22 (discussing hedge fund DIP lending strategy generally) (citing 
Skeel, supra note 2, at 936–37); Aditya Habbu & Nikhil Abraham, DIP Lending and the Death of 
Emergence: Reorganization Outcomes Post-Crisis, 10, 13–14 (Working Paper, March 6, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1779509 (discussing previous research indicating DIP lending correlated with 
higher stand-alone reorganizations, but arguing that DIP lending post-2008 was more likely to result in a 
sale). 
105
 See supra note 96. 
2014] ACTIVIST INVESTORS 187 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Emergence vehicle by pre-petition relationship status among emerging 
fund cases (N=88). 
 
b.  Prepackaged cases as an indicator of efficiency 
 
 The prepackaged chapter 11 case is heralded as an efficient and effective 
restructuring tool.
106
 Nevertheless, some commentators suggest that the speed of the 
prepackaged case might be ill advised, producing only a temporary fix to the 
company's financial problems.  Because the speed often is perceived as favoring, or 
being driven by creditors' interests, we examined the prepackaged and pre-
negotiated cases in the dataset. 
 Of the 490 total cases, all but one had sufficient information to determine 
whether the case was prepackaged or pre-negotiated.  For the purposes of these 
analyses, a case is prepackaged if the debtor drafted the plan, submitted it to a vote 
of the impaired classes, and claimed to have obtained the acceptances necessary for 
consensual confirmation before filing the case.  A case is pre-negotiated if the 
debtor negotiates the plan with less than all groups or obtains the acceptance of less 
than all groups necessary to confirm before the bankruptcy case is filed (voluntarily 
or involuntarily).  Of the 489 cases, 42 were prepackaged (8.6 percent), 106 (21.7 
percent) were pre-negotiated, and the remaining 341 (69.7 percent) were neither.  
As more fully discussed below, only 30 of the 126 fund cases (23.8 percent) were 
prepackaged or pre-negotiated.  
 At first blush, the data might seem surprising in that the relationship between 
having a fund and filing a prepackaged or pre-negotiated case was marginally 
significant [(X
2
(1, N = 489) = 3.352, p = .067] such that fund cases were less likely 
                                                                                                                                              
106
 See Kurt A. Mayr, Enforcing Prepackaged Restructuring of Foreign Debtors Under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2006) (noting prepackaged cases are 
completed quickly and efficiently). 
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than cases without funds to file a prepackaged or pre-negotiated case (23.8 percent 
vs. 32.5 percent, respectively).
107
 Upon reflection, however, these data might 
confirm the anecdotal evidence suggesting an increase in funds purchasing pre-
petition debt positions after the chapter 11 filing to pursue a loan-to-own or 
takeover of the company in the bankruptcy case.  This possibility is further 
supported by our analysis of whether fund participation in the DIP financing was 
related to the likelihood of a case being either prepackaged or pre-negotiated.
108
 Our 
analysis of whether funds' pre-petition debt holdings were related to the likelihood 
of a case being either prepackaged or pre-negotiated are inconclusive with respect 
to this particular inference.
109
 
 
c.  Refiling as an indicator of failure 
  
 Of the 311 emerging cases, only 38 (12.2 percent) cases involved emerging 
companies refiling bankruptcy.  A case is coded as a refiling if more than half of the 
operations of the emerging company subsequently filed another bankruptcy case.  
Commentators have questioned whether the increased participation of funds with 
arguably short investment horizons has caused a spike in bankruptcy failures and 
refilings.
110
 The data do not generally confirm these suspicions.  Specifically, we 
explored whether fund cases were more or less likely to refile than non-fund cases 
(see Figure 5).  As it turns out, statistically speaking, fund cases are as likely as 
non-fund cases to refile [15.2 percent vs. 11.0 percent; X
2
(1, N = 311) = 1.095, p = 
.295)], though the data descriptively suggest that fund cases may be more likely to 
refile.
111
  
                                                                                                                                              
107
 Because of the limited number of cases in these categories, we collapsed prepackaged or pre-negotiated 
cases for purposes of these analyses. 
108
 Of the 42 fund cases with known prepackaged/pre-negotiated and DIP participation outcomes, 10 (23.8 
percent) involved fund participation in the DIP financing. As such, there was limited statistical power to 
detect the relationship between participation in DIP financing and the likelihood of a case being either 
prepackaged or pre-negotiated. The data do suggest, however, that fund cases with such a relationship may 
have been as likely as fund cases with no such relationship to be prepackaged or pre-negotiated (25.0 percent 
vs. 22.2 percent). 
109
 Of the 119 fund cases with known prepackaged/pre-negotiated and pre-petition relationship outcomes, 
68 (57.1 percent) involved such a relationship. Compared to fund cases without a pre-petition debt position, 
fund cases with such a relationship were marginally more likely to be prepackaged or pre-negotiated [30.9 
percent vs. 17.6 percent; X
2
(1, N = 119) = 2.708, p = .100]. 
110
 See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1662 (2009) 
(discussing potential for shorter investment horizons to impact firm's reorganization). 
111
 Approximately 15% of the fund cases refiled, which is slightly higher than the 11% of non-fund cases 
that refiled, however, the difference is not statistically significant. 
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Figure 5. Percentage of emerging cases refiled by fund status (N=311). 
 
 To better understand the lack of an association between fund cases and refiling 
overall, we further analyzed whether fund participation in the DIP financing was 
related to the likelihood of refiling.  Of the 33 emerging fund cases with a known 
DIP financing outcome, 9 (27.3 percent) involved fund participation in the DIP 
financing.  Due to the small number of cases available for analysis, there was 
limited statistical power to detect the relationship between participation in DIP 
financing and the likelihood of refiling.  The data do suggest, however, that 
emerging fund cases with fund participation in the DIP financing may have been as 
likely as emerging fund cases without such fund participation to refile (27.8 percent 
vs. 26.7 percent).   
 We also explored the association between prepackaged/pre-negotiated cases 
and refiling.  Consistent with previous studies,
112
 the data show that, among all 
cases, prepackaged and pre-negotiated cases are more likely to refile than traditional 
reorganizations [12.8 percent vs. 5.6 percent; X
2
(1, N = 489) = 7.602, p = .006)].  
Among only cases with funds, however, the association between prepackaged or 
pre-negotiated and refiling disappeared [16.7 percent vs. 9.4 percent; X
2
(1, N = 
126) = 1.230, p = .267)]. 
 Similarly, we explored whether the presence of a pre-petition debt position was 
related to the likelihood of refiling.  Of the 88 emerging fund cases with known pre-
petition debt position, 59 (67.0 percent) involved such a relationship.  Compared to 
fund cases without a pre-petition debt position, fund cases with such a relationship 
                                                                                                                                              
112
 See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 179, 237 (2007) 
(critiquing LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE 
BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2006)); see also Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based 
Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427–28 (2006) (same). 
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were equally likely to refile [15.3 percent vs. 13.8 percent; X
2
(1, N = 88) = .033, p 
= .856]. 
 
2. Fund Cases and Management (CEOs and CROs) 
 
 As noted above, many commentators have observed an increase in creditor 
control in chapter 11 cases.
113
 Some argue that this shift moves the process away 
from a management-controlled scheme to one dominated by creditors and their 
objectives.
114
 Others view increased creditor participation as neutralizing or better 
balancing the interests and control of management and creditors.
115
 Regardless of 
the correct characterization, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that creditors 
often do seek a change in management, whether by replacing the CEO or installing 
a CRO.
116
 The following data analyze these issues in the context of the fund cases. 
 
a.  Pre-petition change in CEO 
 
 Of the 490 cases, we were able to determine for 342 cases (69.8 percent) 
whether the CEO changed in the three years prior to bankruptcy.  Of those 342 
cases, 88 (25.7 percent) were also fund cases.  We then examined whether fund 
involvement was related to whether the case had a relatively new CEO.  The 
relationship between having a fund and having a relatively new CEO was not 
significant ((X
2
(1, N = 342) = .001, p = .975) such that fund cases were as likely as 
non-fund cases to have a relatively new CEO (64.8 percent vs. 65.0 percent, 
respectively).  Nevertheless, from a descriptive perspective, an overwhelming 
majority of fund cases (64.8 percent) experienced a change at the CEO position in 
the three years prior to the filing of the chapter 11 case. 
 We next considered whether a fund's position in the DIP financing or the pre-
petition debt increased its leverage over management personnel decisions.  Of the 
28 fund cases with known information about the CEO and DIP financing, 15 (53.6 
percent) involved fund participation in the DIP financing.  Due to the small number 
                                                                                                                                              
113
 See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 2, at 512–15. 
114
 See Skeel, supra note 2, at 918 (stating chapter 11 "now has a distinctively creditor-oriented cast"); 
Miller & Waisman, supra note 101, at 155 (arguing that "[m]anagement is often unable to counterbalance 
the influence of creditors"); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever 
of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2006) (discussing how creditors play a larger role 
in corporate affairs today); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 751, 752, 778–89 (2002) (noting company's principal lenders are usually already in control prior to a 
chapter 11 filing and discussing control rights in depth). 
115
 See Harner, Policy Implications, supra note 2, at 709, 760–61 (describing current restructuring model 
as "management-neutral" instead of "management-driven" due to debt investment); Goldschmid, supra note 
81, at 217 (arguing distressed funds are naturally incentivized to balance interests). 
116
 See Harner, Policy Implications, supra note 2, at 721, 723, 726 (citing case studies where CEOs were 
replaced and two CRO appointments); Goldschmid, supra note 81, at 219 (noting creditors often appoint a 
CRO prior to bankruptcy); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 
671, n.117 (2009) (arguing creditors take control and install new officers, often a CRO). 
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of cases available for analysis, there was limited statistical power to detect the 
relationship between DIP financing and management personnel decision.  
Anecdotally, the data suggest that cases with fund participation in DIP financing 
may be more likely to have a relatively new CEO than cases without such fund 
participation (93.3 percent vs. 84.6 percent).  Nevertheless, a fund's pre-petition 
debt position did not produce a similar effect.
117
 
 
b.  CEO leaving prior to confirmation 
 
 Of the 490 cases, we were able to determine for 375 cases (76.5 percent) 
whether the CEO left prior to confirmation.  Of those 375 cases, 95 (25.3 percent) 
were also fund cases.  We then examined whether fund involvement was related to 
whether the CEO left prior to confirmation.  The relationship between having a fund 
and having a CEO leave was not significant ((X
2
(1, N = 375) = 2.041, p = .153) 
such that fund cases were as likely as non-fund cases to have a CEO leave prior to 
confirmation (49.5 percent vs. 41.1 percent, respectively). 
 Similar to our analysis of pre-petition changes in the CEO position, we also 
explored whether fund participation in the DIP financing or pre-petition debt 
influenced a change in CEO prior to confirmation.  Of the 29 fund cases with 
known information about the CEO and DIP financing, 14 (48.3 percent) involved 
fund participation in the DIP financing.  Due to the small number of cases available 
for analysis, there was limited statistical power to detect a relationship between 
changes in the CEO position and DIP financing.  Anecdotally, the data suggest that 
cases with fund participation in DIP financing were as likely as cases without such 
fund participation to have a CEO leave prior to confirmation (50.0 percent vs. 46.2 
percent).  A similar non-result emerged when we analyzed the funds' pre-petition 
debt positions and post-petition CEO changes.
118
 
 
c.  Chief restructuring officers 
 
 Of the 490 total cases, 113 (23.1 percent) had a CRO listed in the disclosure 
statement or media reports regarding the bankruptcy.  Because the appointment of a 
CRO often is viewed as a creditor remedy or a pro-creditor restructuring tool, we 
explored whether fund involvement was related to the likelihood of having a CRO 
(see Figure 6).  In fact, the relationship was marginally significant [(X
2
(1, N = 490) 
= 3.799, p = .051] such that fund cases were more likely than non-fund cases to 
have a CRO (29.4 percent vs. 20.9 percent, respectively). 
                                                                                                                                              
117
 Of the 82 fund cases with a known CEO outcome, 45 (54.9 percent) involved such a relationship. Fund 
cases with a pre-petition debt position were as likely as fund cases without such a relationship to have a 
relatively new CEO ((X
2
(1, N = 82) = .061, p = .805); 62.2 percent vs. 64.9 percent, respectively). 
118
 Of the 91 fund cases with a known CEO outcome, 50 (55.6 percent) involved such a relationship. Fund 
cases with a pre-petition debt position were as likely as fund cases without such a relationship to have a CEO 
leave prior to confirmation ((X
2
(1, N = 91) = 2.464, p = .116); 42.0 percent vs. 58.5 percent, respectively). 
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Figure 6. Percentage of cases with CRO by fund status (N=490). 
 
 The appointment of a CRO is not only a creditor remedy, but it also is 
frequently viewed as a senior creditor remedy, invoked as a compromise between 
the company and its senior lenders to resolve management personnel disputes or to 
provide creditors with greater comfort concerning management decisions.  As such, 
we explored whether fund participation in the DIP financing was related to the 
likelihood of having a CRO.  Of the 42 emerging fund cases with known CRO and 
DIP financing outcomes, 24 (57.1 percent) involved fund participation in the DIP 
financing.  Due to the small number of cases available for analysis, there was 
limited statistical power to detect the relationship between participation in DIP 
financing and the likelihood of refiling.  The data do suggest, however, that fund 
cases with such a relationship may have been as likely as fund cases with no such 
relationship to have a CRO (37.5 percent vs. 33.3 percent).   
 Similarly, we explored whether the presence of a pre-petition debt position was 
related to the likelihood of having a CRO.  Of the 119 fund cases with a known 
CRO outcome, 68 (57.1 percent) involved such a relationship.  Compared to fund 
cases without a pre-petition debt position, fund cases with such a relationship were 
marginally less likely to have a CRO [22.1 percent vs. 37.3 percent; X
2
(1, N = 119) 
= .3.298, p = .069]. 
 
3. Impact on Value 
 
 The data largely track the anecdotal evidence.  Debtors that have funds in their 
capital structures frequently emerge from chapter 11.  Cases such as Tribune, 
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Kmart, Lyondell, and Six Flags illustrate that reorganization and even post-
emergence profit are attainable with fund investors.
119
 What the data do not show is 
what some perceive as the "messy" nature of these chapter 11 cases.  As discussed 
in Part I, cases with funds can be litigious, acrimonious, long, and expensive.  Do 
these factors significantly affect value?  Some empirical studies suggest no,
120
 but 
further studies and analysis are needed.
121
 
 A critical component of these future analyses will be how the studies define 
value and success.  Empirical data and results will vary widely depending on these 
definitions.  For example, value/success might be assessed based on original face 
value of the company's debt and the chapter 11 recoveries.  Alternatively, 
value/success might turn on the existence of an ongoing, viable business in some 
form post-emergence regardless of debt recoveries.  Notably, the definitions have 
even wider fluctuation when viewed through the prism of a particular debt or equity 
holder or management.  Although many of these definitions might be tested 
empirical, some are more difficult to measure.  Yet, all of these definitions are 
relevant to the underlying policies of chapter 11. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 It is apparent that funds often do matter in chapter 11 cases.  The data strongly 
suggest that funds can influence the restructuring efforts of a distressed company.  
What is less certain, however, is whether that influence is positively or negatively 
associated with value.  For example, though the data suggest that companies 
targeted by funds are more likely to emerge, this could be attributed to the 
investment selection criteria of the fund, the fund's tactics within the chapter 11 
case, the fund's resources or expertise, or any other of a multitude of factors.  In 
addition, cases with funds are more likely to have a CRO and are likely to 
experience a pre-petition change at the CEO position.  That type of influence may 
                                                                                                                                              
119
 In re Premier Int'l. Holdings, Inc. ("Six Flags"), 423 B.R. 58, 58 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); In re Lyondell 
Chem. Co., 420 B.R. 571, 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 126 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2008); In re Kmart Corp., No. 03-C-0096, 2003 WL 23162412 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2003). See 
also Harner, Policy Implications, supra note 2, at 725–27 (discussing Kmart's restructuring); Harner, Activist 
Distressed Debtholders, supra note 74, at 167–68 (discussing the Lyondell restructuring). But see, e.g., In re 
Am. Remanufacturers, 439 B.R. 633, 633 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (dispute between funds holding different 
tranches of company's debt arguably caused the conversion of the chapter 11 case to one under chapter 7, 
resulting in a fire sale of the company's assets); see also Harner, Policy Implications, supra note 2, at 755–
756 (discussing the In re American Remanufacturers case). 
120
 Notably, our own data reflect these assertions, at least in regard to one of these factors: case duration. 
The presence of a fund vying for control is significantly associated with an increase in the median length of 
chapter 11 cases from 325 days to 411 days; however, due to asymmetry in the distribution of case length, 
funds do not significantly increase the mean (average) length of chapter 11 cases. 
121
 See Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 534–37 (describing how hedge funds that serve on the unsecured 
creditors committee often object to key plan terms, etc., and that despite these adversarial activities, hedge 
fund involvement on creditors' committees has a positive effect on a number of factors). See also Altman, 
supra note 73; Li & Wang, supra note 70; Lim, supra note 70; Ellias, supra note 70. 
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concern management but, depending on the case and circumstances, may ultimately 
benefit the company and all stakeholders.  Moreover, a fund's presence did not on 
average have a significant impact on the duration of chapter 11 cases, nor did fund 
presence affect likelihood of failure (measured by refiling) of the chapter 11 case. 
 That being said, the most striking aspect to these data is the suggestion that 
chapter 11 can function, sometimes quite well, with fund participants.  The data 
highlighted in this study are informative not only for the differences they show 
between fund and non-fund cases, but also for the non-differences; cases with funds 
vying for control resemble other chapter 11 cases in various ways.  The challenge 
then for policymakers, practitioners, and academics is to identify factors that 
support value-enhancing activities while mitigating potentially destructive investor 
tactics.  Notably, this challenge is not all that different from the balancing 
historically required of policymakers in the debtor-creditor arena.  Many 
creditors—whether funds, banks, landlords, pension funds, or trade creditors—have 
the resources and sometimes the intent to delay or derail chapter 11 cases.  The one 
potential difference is the dearth of information concerning funds' investment 
holdings, strategies, and objectives.  Nevertheless, as more data are collected and 
studies are performed, policymakers should be well equipped to assess and maintain 
balance on the chapter 11 playing field. 
